NTRUEncrypt is a fast and practical lattice-based public-key encryption scheme, which has been standardized by IEEE, but until recently, its security analysis relied only on heuristic arguments, which limited the confidence in its security. Recently, this situation has changed, when Stehlé and Steinfeld showed that a slight variant (that we call pNE) could be proven to be secure under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA), assuming the hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices. However, for general purpose applications, it is widely accepted that an encryption scheme should satisfy the stronger notion of security under chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2), and the pNE scheme is insecure in this model. To fill this gap, we present a variant of pNE called NTRUCCA, that is IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model assuming the hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices, and only incurs a constant factor overhead in ciphertext and key length over the pNE scheme. To our knowledge, our result gives the first IND-CCA2 secure variant of NTRUEncrypt in the standard model, based on standard cryptographic assumptions. As an intermediate step, we present a construction for an All-But-One (ABO) lossy trapdoor function from pNE, which may be of independent interest. Our scheme uses the lossy trapdoor function framework of Peikert and Waters, which we generalize to the case of (k − 1)-of-k-correlated input distributions.
Introduction

Background
It is now widely recognized that most practical applications of public-key cryptosystems require more than the basic passive security against chosen-plaintext eavesdropping attacks (known as IND-CPA security). The de facto standard requirement that suffices for the majority of applications is security against chosen-ciphertext attacks, known as IND-CCA2 security, as first defined and studied by Naor and Yung [NY90] and Rackoff and Simon [RS92] (see [Sho98] for a discussion on the practical importance of chosen-ciphertext security). While these seminal works provided cryptosystems achieving the IND-CCA2 security goal under general cryptographic assumptions, their instantiation based on concrete assumptions resulted in very inefficient schemes. The focus of this area then moved to the design of efficient IND-CCA2 schemes based on concrete cryptographic assumptions.
With the recent development of lattice-based cryptography, a public-key cryptosystem with public-key length O(n 2 log 2 n) and ciphertext length O(n log 2 n) (for security parameter n) was given by Regev [Reg09] , having IND-CPA security provably based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, which in turn was shown to be as hard as the quantum worst-case hardness of standard lattice problems. A 'dual' variant system with similar complexity was later proposed in [GPV08] . The large quadratic factor n 2 in the public-key length is due to the unstructured matrices used in the LWE problem. By moving to a structured matrix (first proposed for lattice-based hash functions in [Mic07, LM06, PR06] ), it was shown independently and concurrently in [SSTX09] and [LPR10] how one could construct variants of Regev's cryptosystem based on the Ring-LWE problem (a variant of LWE over rings of cyclotomic number fields) with IND-CPA security provably based on the quantum worst-case hardness of lattice problems over the class of structured lattices called ideal lattices. The corresponding structured matrices allow the public-key length to be reduced to O(n log n) (as well as the encryption and decryption complexity, by using FFT techniques).
While the above systems are supported by theoretically sound proofs of security, the most practical and efficient lattice-based cryptosystem to date has been the NTRU encryption scheme, proposed in 1998 [HPS98, Cry02] . The scheme, now known as NTRUEncrypt, has been suggested as one of the most practical public-key encryption scheme with conjectured 'post-quantum' security (see, e.g., [PC09] ). Its practicality is also evidenced by its industrial standardization by the IEEE [IEE] . However, until recently, the security of NTRUEncrypt has only been analyzed heuristically. But recently, Stehlé and Steinfeld [SS11a] showed that a slight variant of NTRUEncrypt (that we call pNE) can be shown to achieve IND-CPA security based on worst-case lattice problems over ideal lattices. Unfortunately, the pNE scheme (like the original NTRUEncrypt scheme) is trivially insecure against chosen-ciphertext attacks, due to its homomorphic properties.
Our Results
The practicality and standardization of the NTRUEncrypt scheme on the one hand, together with the recent result of [SS11a] on the passive (IND-CPA) security of a slight variant of NTRUEncrypt, raise the natural question of whether NTRUEncrypt can be adapted efficiently to achieve IND-CCA2 security in the standard model, while preserving the strong security guarantees of [SS11a] based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems in ideal lattices. In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively, in the asymptotic sense. We present a variant of NTRUEncrypt called NTRUCCA, that is IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model assuming the worst-case quantum hardness of problems in ideal lattices, and only incurs a constant factor overhead in ciphertext and key length over the pNE variant shown to be IND-CPA in [SS11a] . Namely, our scheme still enjoys a key and ciphertext length and encryption/decryption computation costs quasi-linear in the security parameter, given the best known attacks. To our knowledge, our scheme is the first efficient variant of NTRUEncrypt achieving IND-CCA2 security based on standard cryptographic assumptions. We emphasize that our aim is here is to show the asymptotic feasibility of obtaining an efficient IND-CCA2 NTRUEncrypt variant from standard cryptographic assumptions, and we leave it to future work to reduce the constant factor overhead incurred by our construction, as well as the overhead incurred by the pNE scheme of [SS11a] over the original NTRUEncrypt scheme.
As an intermediate step, we present a construction for an All-But-One (ABO) lossy trapdoor function from pNE, which may be of independent interest. The public key of our ABO function consists of just one NTRU public-key and one NTRU ciphertext, while our function output is a single NTRU ciphertext. As part of our ABO construction, using the results of [SS11b] on a variant of the NTRUSign signature scheme, we also present a variant of pNE, preserving its security reduction, but with full randomness recovery during decryption (i.e. the randomness used in encryption is recovered during decryption along with the message, whereas in the pNE scheme from [SS11a] , only the message is recovered in decryption). Our NTRUCCA scheme is built from our ABO lossy trapdoor function by using a generalization of the generic Peikert-Waters construction of IND-CCA2 encryption from ABO lossy trapdoor functions. This generalization, which may be of independent interest, is required since our pNE-based ABO does not have a sufficient lossiness to be used within the generic IND-CCA2 construction of Peikert and Waters [PW08] . Our generalized construction uses (k − 1)-of-k-correlated input distributions (used also in [MY10] ) to weaken the lossiness requirement from the ABO sufficiently to allow us to use it.
Related Work
The first construction of a cryptosystem with IND-CCA2 security provably based on worst-case lattice problems (in the standard model) was given by Peikert and Waters [PW08] . Their general framework, which also forms the basis for our result, was a construction of IND-CCA2 secure encryption from a primitive called a lossy ABO trapdoor function family, along with a one-time signature scheme. They then showed how to construct a lossy ABO family from the LWE problem (and hence from worst-case lattice problems). The resulting IND-CCA2 scheme, however, has quadratic complexity Ω(n 2 ) in the security parameter n due to the use of the LWE problem in the underlying ABO, rather than the structured Ring-LWE problem. While the ABO construction of [PW08] could be applied in the Ring-LWE setting to obtain a quasi-linear complexity in n (like the complexity of our NTRUEncrypt-based ABO in this paper), the lossiness of the construction is based on non-square Ring-LWE matrices (having at least two ring elements), and is not directly applicable to our NTRUEncrypt setting in which the Ring-LWE matrix is square and consists of a single ring element. Instead, we show how to use a 'masking' based approach to provide lossiness in our NTRUEncrypt-based ABO (see Section 3 for more details).
Rosen and Segev [RS09] gave another general construction for an IND-CCA2 secure scheme inspired by Peikert and Waters [PW08] , but starting from a weaker primitive called a correlation-secure trapdoor function family (which can be constructed from a lossy trapdoor function family). Subsequently, Peikert [Pei09] showed how to construct a correlation-secure trapdoor function family from the LWE problem, and used it within the Rosen-Segev scheme, to obtain another lattice-based IND-CCA2 secure scheme. Unfortunately, the latter scheme suffers from long public-key and ciphertext length of Ω(n 3 ) in the security parameter n, due to an inherent inefficiency of the Rosen-Segev scheme that requires ciphertexts to contain k = Ω(n) evaluations of functions from the correlationsecure family 1 .
More constructions of IND-CCA2 secure lattice-based encryption schemes can be obtained by using the latticebased selective-ID secure IBE schemes of [ABB10a, ABB10b] within the generic construction of [BCHK06] , together with a one-time signature. The most efficient IBE scheme from [ABB10a] can give an IND-CCA2 scheme with public key length O(n 2 log n) and ciphertext length O(n log n) with security based on LWE. Adapting this scheme to the Ring-LWE setting can reduce the public key length to O(n log n) with security based on the Decision Ring-LWE problem, but the mechanism for encoding identities in the scheme requires one to use an underlying ring R q = Z q [x]/(f (x)) with an overwhelming fraction of elements being invertible. The latter requirement implies a choice of q such that f (x) has only a small number of irreducible factors modulo q. However, this contradicts the requirement of the search to decision Ring-LWE reduction of [LPR10] (a component of the reduction from worst-case problems in ideal lattices to the decision Ring-LWE problem), that requires q such that f (x) splits into linear factors mod q (or at least, splits into at least Ω(n/ log n) factors, for a reduction run-time polynomial in n). Consequently, until very recently it was unknown how to instantiate this scheme efficiently with a poly-time reduction from worst-case problems in ideal lattices, but this has now been resolved by Langlois and Stehlé [LS12] , who show the hardness of decision Ring-LWE for any modulus q. A similar and more efficient (in terms of constant factors) system can be derived by adapting the recent techniques of [MP12] to the Ring-LWE setting.
The 'masking' approach we use for constructing our NTRUEncrypt based ABO is similar to that used in constructions of lossy functions in [FGK + 10] based on classical number-theoretic assumptions; our construction shows how to extend this approach to the NTRUEncrypt setting. Our use of a (k − 1)-of-k-correlated input distribution in our IND-CCA2 scheme is similar to a technique used by Mol and Yilek [MY10] to improve the Rosen-Segev [RS09] construction. As we observe, our generalized Peikert-Waters construction offers substantial efficiency gains by a factor linear in the security parameter over the Rosen-Segev construction, when one starts from an ABO lossy trapdoor function losing a constant fraction of its input entropy (as is the case for our NTRUEncrypt-based ABO function).
We mention that the above discussion (and our result in this paper) focuses exclusively on achieving IND-CCA2 security in the standard model, based on standard cryptographic assumptions. If one is willing to use hash functions modeled as random oracles [BR93] in the security analysis, then one can obtain very efficient IND-CCA2 secure variants of NTRUEncrypt by standard transformations from IND-CPA secure cryptosystems [FO99] , or by using more optimized variants tailored for NTRUEncrypt, such as [NP02, HGSSW03, Sta05] . However, in practice, when the random oracle is instantiated with a public cryptographic hash function, one does not obtain any security guarantees for the resulting scheme from standard cryptographic assumptions.
Organization
Section 2 summarizes existing definitions and results that we use. In Section 3, we first show how to modify the provably secure pNE variant of [SS11a] to allow randomness recovery during decryption, and then we use this variant to construct our ABO lossy trapdoor function. Section 4 begins by presenting a generalization of the generic IND-CCA2 construction of [PW08] from an ABO lossy trapdoor function family, that relaxes the lossiness requirement of the original construction, and then we explain how to instantiate this generalized transform with our ABO construction to obtain the NTRUCCA scheme. The last section concludes this paper by presenting some open problems our work leads to.
Preliminaries
Notations and Remarks
We assume throughout this paper that n is a power of 2, and q is a prime such that x n + 1 splits into n linear factors modulo q (i.e. 2n divides q − 1) and we use the asymptotic notations
We also use the following notations:
• R × q : the set of invertible elements of R q , 
Lattice Background
Definition 3 For a lattice L and a deviation parameter
We denote by χ α a certain discrete 'Gaussian-like' distribution (denotedΓ α in [SS11a]) on ring R, which is used in [LPR10] as the error distribution for the Ring-LWE problem in order to allow a security reduction from the γ-Ideal-SVP problem. The precise definition of this distribution is quite technical (we refer to [SS11a] and [LPR10] for more details). For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to know that χ α can be sampled efficiently (in expected time O(n)) and samples from it have small norms bounded as in the following results.
Lemma 1 ([SS11b])
Let y, r ∈ R, with r fixed and y sampled from χ α . Then
Let R p denote the elements of R with infinity norm < p/2 with p = Poly(n). For our ABO construction, we need a stronger version of this Lemma that works simultaneously for all p n elements r ∈ R p , rather than just for one fixed r.
Lemma 2 (Adapted from [SS11b] ) For y sampled from χ α , we have:
and 
The security reduction from [LPR10] is the following.
Theorem 1 (Adapted from [LPR10])
Assume that αq = ω(n √ log n) (resp. Ω(n 1.5 )) with α ∈ (0, 1) and q = Poly(n). There exists a randomized polynomial-time (resp. subexponential) quantum reduction from γ-Ideal-SVP to R-LWE q,α , with γ = ω(n 1.5 log n)/α (resp. Ω(n 2.5 )/α).
We recall the scheme pNE, the provably secure variant of NTRUEncrypt, with parameters n, q, p, α, σ [SS11a] . The parameters n and q define the rings
defines the plaintext message space as P = R/pR.
• Return secret key sk = f ∈ R × q and public key pk = h = g/f ∈ R × q . Encryption. Given message M ∈ P, set s, e ←֓ χ α and return ciphertext C = p · (hs + e) + M ∈ R q . Decryption. Given ciphertext C and secret key f , compute
Note that pNE differs from the original NTRUEncrypt [HPS98] in several minor aspects that allow a security proof relative to the worst-case hardness of problems in ideal lattices: the choice of ring
, the choice of q prime (versus q a power of 2), the choice of distributions for f, g as restricted discrete Gaussians (versus sparse binary polynomials), and the extra error term pe in encryption C = phs+pe+M (versus C = phs + M ).
For our ABO lossy trapdoor construction, we will need a variant of NTRU in which the message space B is an exponentially large subset of
is invertible in R p if and only if it is coprime to f i over Z p for all i = 1, . . . , r. The following lemma shows how to choose p such that r = 2 and f 1 , f 2 are both irreducibles of degree n/2. This means that any non-zero polynomial of degree < n/2 will be invertible in R p , which allows us to take B = {b ∈ R p : deg(b) < n/2}.
Lemma 3 ([BGM93]) If n = 2
k with k ≥ 2 and p is a prime with p ≡ 3 mod 8, then
Our generalized Peikert-Waters construction of IND-CCA2 encryption from lossy trapdoor functions uses the following Generalized Leftover Hash lemma.
Lemma 4 ([DORS08])
Suppose that random variable X on {0, 1} n has min-entropy ℓ x and random variable Y (that may depend on X) has at most 2 ℓy possible values. Let H be a family of universal hash functions from {0, 1}
the statistical distance between (h, h(X), Y ) (for h chosen uniformly from H) and (h, r, Y ) (for h chosen uniformly from H and r chosen uniformly and independently from {0, 1}
ℓ ) is at most ǫ.
ABO Lossy Trapdoor Functions
We recall the definition of ABO Lossy Trapdoor Functions [PW08] .
Definition 5 An ABO Lossy Trapdoor Function Family
F = (KG F , F, F −1 )
is a collection of three polynomial time algorithms:
• Key Generation algorithm KG F : On input 1 n (for a security parameter n ∈ N), and a lossy branch b * ∈ B (where B denotes the branch space), the probabilistic key generation algorithm KG F outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
• Evaluation algorithm F: On input public key pk, x ∈ X (where X denotes the function input space) and branch b ∈ B, the deterministic function evaluation algorithm F returns an output y = F(pk, b, x) ∈ Y (where Y denotes the output space).
• Inversion algorithm F −1 : On input y ∈ Y , b ∈ B and secret key sk, the deterministic inversion algorithm
where ⊥ indicates an inversion failure).
These algorithms satisfy the following properties, for some parameters δ ∈ (0, 1) (failure probability) and ρ ∈ (0, 1) (lossiness leakage rate):
For any b * ∈ B, except with negligible probability ≤ δ over the key pair
• ρ-Lossiness (with failure probability δ): For any b * ∈ B, except with negligible probability ≤ δ over the key pair (sk, pk) output by KG F (n, b * ), the size of the image set {y ∈ Y : ∃x ∈ X with y = F(pk, b
• 
Remark 2 In our definition of ρ-lossiness, ρ is an upper bound on the leakage rate of the lossy branch, i.e. the fraction of the input min-entropy that is leaked by the output.
An ABO Lossy Trapdoor Function from pNE
Modifying pNE for Full Randomness Recovery in Decryption
The decryption algorithm for the provable NTRUEncrypt variant pNE from [SS11a] only recovers the encrypted message M but not the randomness (s, e) used to encrypt M . For constructing the ABO trapdoor function that is used in our NTRUCCA scheme, we need an additional randomness recovery algorithm that can also recover the randomness (s, e). In this section, we show how to modify the scheme pNE to achieve this, while preserving its security reduction. It turns out that most of the tools we need in this section have been worked out in [SS11b] for the purpose of analyzing the NTRUSign signature scheme, and we only need to slightly tweak them for our application.
Our main observation for constructing a randomness recovery algorithm for pNE is that, after M is recovered by the decryption algorithm and
we have:
The vector c = [
q is in the form of an (Ring) LWE instance c = A · s + e over the ring R q , where
for the matrix A over R, (i.e. the entries of T have 'small' coefficients, T · A = 0 mod q and T has full rank over the field K = Q[x]/(x n + 1)), the randomness e can be recovered by standard techniques for LWE inversion [GPV08, Pei09, SSTX09], namely one can compute T · c mod q = T · e mod q = T e, where the last equality holds over K, since T · e ∞ < q/2 when T and e are sufficiently small. Since T has full rank over K, T −1 exists over K, and e can be recovered from e = T −1 · (T · c mod q). Note that since the secret key polynomials
T can serve as the first row of the trapdoor matrix T .
In designing their signature scheme, the NTRUSign authors [HHGP + 03] give a heuristic algorithm to compute another small pair (F, G) ∈ R 2 such that F · h − G mod q, which is linearly independent of [f, g] over K. A variant of this algorithm, that we call TrapKG, is presented and analyzed rigorously in [SS11b] . In [SS11b] , the algorithm TrapKG is applied for obtaining a provably secure variant of NTRUSign. Here, we apply it to obtain a provably secure variant of pNE with full randomness recovery. For our latter application, one does not need to store the full trapdoor matrix T . Indeed, from the above description of the decryption process, it is clear that one needs only store (f, F ) (which suffices for computing T · c mod q) and a low precision approximation T to T −1 (which suffices for recovering e ∈ R 2 by rounding the coordinates of T ·(T · c mod q) to the nearest integers).
The algorithm TrapKG is depicted as Primitive 2. As we shall see in Section 4, in order to obtain a high efficiency for our NTRUCCA scheme, we will choose p = n θ(1) , versus the choice p = O(1) used in pNE. Consequently, to simplify the analysis and obtain a tighter security reduction with this choice for our NTRUCCA scheme, we have dropped the restriction f = 1 mod p in key generation that is used in pNE. Instead, we sample f from a Gaussian (as in the NTRUSign key generation algorithm of [SS11b] ), but here we must reject and resample f if it is not invertible mod q or mod p (whereas in the signing application of [SS11b] invertibility mod p is not required). To ensure that an overwhelming fraction of R p is invertible, we impose the condition p = 3 mod 8 and apply Lemma 3.
Proof.
As in the proof of Lemma 4.1 in [SS11b] , the probability that f ∈ R × q is the probability that f falls in the ideal I := q, Φ k for some k ∈ [n], where Φ k denotes the kth irreducible factor of x n + 1 mod q. Assuming σ ≥ n ln(2n(1 + 1/δ))/π · q 1/2 , it is shown in [SS11b] that f ∈ I with probability ≤ 1/q + 2δ and hence by the union bound over all k ∈ [n], f ∈ R × q with probability at most n(1/q + 2δ).
We use a similar argument to bound the probability that f ∈ R × p . The difference is that, from p = 3 mod 8 and Lemma 3, x n +1 splits into 2 irreducible factors θ 1 , θ 2 mod p, so the associated ideals J = q, θ k have norm q n/2 .
Primitive 2 Full Trapdoor Key Generation Algorithm
6. Use Babai's nearest plane algorithm to approximate (F q , G q ) by an integer linear combination of
9. Compute T ∈ K 2×2 , an approximation to T −1 (over K) with precision η. (i.e. the entries of matrix
have infinity norm at most η).
Return secret key
This leads to the bound 2 · (1/q n/2 + 2δ) on the probability that f ∈ R × p .
The algorithm TrapKG (Primitive 2) differs from the NTRUSign key generation algorithm analyzed in [SS11b] only in the extra rejection step for f if f ∈ R p . Using the above Lemma 5 (in place of Lemma 4.1 of [SS11b] ) to evaluate the rejection probability in the proof of Lemma 4.4 of [SS11b] gives the following performance result for this algorithm. 
Our modified pNE scheme allowing randomness recovery in decryption, called pNErr, is shown as Primitive 3. Its key generation is modified to generate a full trapdoor using algorithm TrapKG, and it has a new randomness recovery algorithm that recovers the encryption randomness (s, e), after the message M is recovered with the normal decryption algorithm. As mentioned above, the decryption algorithm for pNErr requires an additional multiplication by f −1 p mod p during decryption (versus pNE) since in pNErr we have dropped the restriction f = 1 mod p.
Correctness of Decryption and Randomness Recovery
Conditions on the scheme parameters that guarantee correctness of decryption and randomness recovery are summarized in the following Lemma. Note that we gain a factor p over the bounds in [SS11b] due to dropping the condition f = 1 mod p in key generation.
Lemma 6 If ω(
√ n log n) α p σ < 1, the decryption algorithm of pNErr recovers M with probability 1 − n
over the choice of s, e, f, g. If the conditions ω(n log n) α σ < 1 and η < 
Decryption. Given ciphertext C and secret key (f, F, T ), compute C ′ = f · C ∈ R q and return message
Randomness Recovery. Given ciphertext C, message M and secret key (f, F, T ), compute
, where ⌈·⌋ denotes rounding coordinate-wise to the nearest integers. Return (s, e) .
Proof. The decryption algorithm computes
e., the decryption algorithm succeeds. It thus suffices to give an upper bound on the probability that C ′′ ∞ > q/2. Using Theorem 2, we have pf , pg ≤ √ npσ. Using Lemma 1, both pf s and pge have infinity norms ≤ 4αq √ nω(log n) · pσ, with probability 1 − n −ω(1) . Also, by Lemma 2.9 of [SS11b] , we have f M ∞ ≤ √ nω( √ log n)pσ with probability 1 − n −ω(1) . By a union bound, we get the claimed bound on the decryption algorithm success probability if the condition ω( √ n log n)αpσ < 1 holds.
As explained above, the randomness recovery algorithm computes
and T is the trapdoor matrix computed in algorithm TrapKG. Let √ n log n)σ (resp. F e + Gs ∞ ≤ 8αqω(n log n)σ), with probability 1 − n −ω(1) . Thus, the condition ω(n log n) α σ < 1 suffices to make T · [e, s] T ∞ < q/2 hold with probability 1 − n −ω(1) . To show that randomness recovery succeeds when the latter occurs, notice that
T has integer coefficients of magnitude < q/2, randomness recovery succeeds if ε T · [e, s] T ∞ < 1/2, and the latter holds by the assumed upper bound on η since ε T · [e, s] T ∞ < mnηq/2.
Security
As in [SS11b] , the security of the scheme follows from the invertibility of p in R q , and the hardness of the decisional Ring LWE problem in R q with h uniform in R × q . Here we also have to deal with the additional fact that h is sampled from a distribution that is rejected with constant probability from an almost uniform distribution on R Proof. Let D KG denote the distribution of h sampled by the TrapKG algorithm in the key generation of pNErr. We proceed in two steps.
In the first step, we use the IND-CPA attack A against pNErr to construct an algorithm A 1 that solves the problem R-LWE * α,q , of distinguishing whether an input sample (h, y) comes from the distribution D KG × U (R q ), or from the distribution D KG × A h,χ , where a sample y from A χ is computed as y = h · s + e with s and e independently sampled from χ α . This step is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 5.2 in [SS11b] , and we omit its description here. It gives an algorithm A 1 against R-LWE * α,q with run-time T 1 ≈ T and distinguishing advantage δ.
In the second step, we use algorithm A 1 to construct an algorithm B against the R-LWE α,q problem. For each h ∈ R × q , let p A (h) (resp. p U (h)) denote the probability that A 1 returns 1 on input (h, y), over the choice of y from the distribution A h,χ (resp. U (R q )), and let
By Theorem 2, we know that D KG is rejected with a constant probability c < 1 from a distribution within statistical distance ∆ = q −Ω(n) to the uniform distribution on R Instead, we use a random sampling argument similar to one used in Lemma 5.4 of [Reg09] . We use the fact that , y) , the algorithm B computes estimatesp A (h) andp U (h) to p A (h) and p U (h) respectively using random sampling, up to additive error ≤δ 16 . By the Chernoff bound, B can achieve this error, except with exponentially small probability 2
It follows that
−Ω(n) , by running 
Our ABO Lossy Trapdoor Function
Outline
We now use the pNErr scheme to construct an ABO Lossy Trapdoor function. Our construction uses as a starting point the paradigm underlying the constructions presented in [PW08] . In this paradigm, one starts with an encryption scheme E that is homomorphic with respect to addition and multiplication by known messages, i.e. given a ciphertext c = E(b) for message b, and two messages b 1 and b 2 , then c
Given such an encryption scheme E, for a desired lossy branch b * , the ABO key generation algorithm computes ciphertext pk = E(b * ) as the public key (with the decryption key as the trapdoor), and on input a message x and branch b, the function evaluation algorithm computes
). Thus, when evaluating F on the lossy branch (b = b * ), we just have F (pk, b, x) = E(0), a ciphertext of a zero message independent of x, and we may hope that F (pk, b * , x) indeed loses at least some information on x, whereas for b = b * , we have
Unfortunately, this idea does not immediately work for pNErr. On the positive side, the pNErr scheme has the desired homomorphic properties. Namely, given a ciphertext c = h · s + pe + M ∈ R q for a message M ∈ R p and two messages M 1 , M 2 ∈ R p , we have that
assuming that M 1 s and M 1 e are chosen small enough compared to q. The problem is that the resulting function evaluated on a lossy branch i.e. y = F (pk, b * , x) = x · (pk − b) = x · (hs + pe), is not lossy, indeed it is injective with high probability. This is because pk − b may be invertible in R q , and even if it is not, one can recover x with high probability from x · s and x · e, where the latter two can be recovered from y = x · (hs + pe) = h · (xs) + p(xe) and h using the randomness recovery algorithm of pNErr.
Our solution to the lossiness problem of the above construction uses the observation that pNErr is in fact additively homomorphic with respect to addition of two ciphertexts, not just with respect to addition of a known message to a ciphertext, i.e. given ciphertexts E(b 1 ) and E(b 2 ) for messages b 1 , b 2 respectively, E(b 1 ) + E(b 2 ) is a ciphertext for the message b 1 + b 2 . This means that we can modify the function evaluation algorithm to add an encryption of the zero message without hurting message recovery for injective branches, i.e. we can use the function evaluation y = F (pk, b, (x,s,ē)) = x · (pk − b) + (hs + pē) = h(xs +s) + p(xe +ē) + x(b * − b), where hs + pē is a random ciphertext for the zero message. Note that y is still an encryption of x(b * − b) as before, allowing recovery of x by decryption for injective branches. But the additional randomness ofs,ē masks the x-dependent terms xe and xs in y for evaluation of F on the branch b = b * , making this branch lossy, as required, assuming the masking termss,ē are sufficiently large. Of course, since F must be a deterministic algorithm, the masking termss,ē now become part of the function input (along with x), and must be recoverable by the ABO's inversion algorithm F −1 for injective branches b = b * . For the latter, note that once x is recovered (by the decryption algorithm), then we can recover the added ciphertext of zero, namely y − x(pk − b) = hs + pē and use the randomness recovery algorithm of pNErr to obtains,ē.
Construction
The precise definition of our ABO construction F NTRU is represented as Primitive 4.
Primitive 4 ABO lossy trapdoor function family F NTRU (n, q, p,p, σ, α, η)
Key generation KG F NTRU : Given as input 1 n , primes q, p, integerp and reals α, σ, η and b * ∈ B (where B = {b ∈ R p : deg(b) < n/2} denotes the branch space), run the key generation algorithm of pNErr on input (1 n , q, p, σ, α, ρ) to obtain a public key h = gf −1 ∈ R × q and a secret key (f, F, T ) for pNErr. Return pk = (h, c = p · (hs + e) + b * ∈ R q ), where s, e ←֓ χ α and sk = (f, F, T ).
Evaluation algorithm F: Given as input public key pk
= (h, c) ∈ R 2 q , branch b ∈ B and function input (x,s,ē) ∈ X (where X = R p × R 2 p denotes the input space), return y = F((h, c), b, (x,s,ē)) = (c − b) · x + p · (hs +ē) ∈ R q .
Inversion algorithm F
−1 : Given as input y ∈ R q , b ∈ B and secret key sk = (f, F, T ):
• Use the decryption algorithm of pNErr to decrypt ciphertext y with secret key f to recover message
denote multiplicative inverses of f and b * − b, respectively, in R p ).
• Compute y ′′ = y − (c − b) · x ∈ R q and use the randomness recovery algorithm of pNErr to recover randomness (s,ē) from ciphertext y ′′ with message 0 and secret key sk (i.e. compute t e = f p
, where ⌈·⌋ denotes rounding coordinate-wise to the nearest integers).
• Return (x,s,ē).
The following states the conditions for inversion correctness. Note that unlike the correctness property shown in Lemma 6 for pNErr, which is only valid probabilistically over the randomness of the encryption algorithm, our definition of ABO inversion correctness requires that, except for a set of keys of negligible probability, inversion succeeds for all valid outputs of F. This is required for the CCA security proof, to prevent attacks that choose outputs that make the inversion fail in one game but not the other.
Lemma 8 (Inversion Correctness)
Proof. Any output y = F((h, c), b, (x,s,ē)) of F has the form of a pNErr ciphertext y = p · (hs exists by construction. Thus, similarly to the proof of Lemma 6, a sufficient condition for successful recovery of x is that C ′ ∞ < q/2, where
Since each coefficient of gs ′ is an inner product of the coefficient vector of g and a rotated coefficient vector of s ′ (with some sign flips), the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives gs
for every x ∈ R p , except with probability ≤ n −ω(1) (resp. ≤ 2 −Ω(n) ) over the choice of s during key generation. Since s ≤ √ np, it follows that pgs ′ ∞ ≤ p 2 ·ω(n 2 √ log n)·αq·σ+pp·n·σ (resp. pgs ′ ∞ ≤ p 2 ·n 2.5 ·αq·σ+pp·n·σ). The same argument gives the same bound on pf e ′ ∞ . Finally, applying Cauchy-Schwarz again, we have f (b
This implies C ′ ∞ < q/2 by the assumed lower bound on q.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 6, the inversion algorithm succeeds to recover
T ∞ < q/2 and η < 1 mnq . Using the bounds f , g , F , G ≤ nσ from Theorem 2, and ē , s ≤p √ n, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives fē + gs ∞ , Fē + Gs ∞ ≤pn 1.5 σ < q/2, by the assumed condition on q, as required.
We now analyze the lossiness of F NTRU .
Lemma 9 (Lossiness)
with failure probability n −ω(1) (resp. 2 −Ω(n) ), with ρ ≤ log(4p 2 ) log(pp 2 ) .
Proof.
For evaluation on the lossy branch b * , the function output is h · (xs +s) + p(xe +ē). Hence the number of possible outputs N is upper bounded by (2B + 1) 2n , where B is an upper bound on xs +s ∞ and xe +ē ∞ . By Lemma 2, we have xs
for all x ∈ R p except with probability ≤ n −ω(1) (resp. 2 −Ω(n) ) over the choice of s ←֓ χ α in key generation, and s ∞ ≤p/2 (the same bounds also hold for xe ∞ and ē ∞ , respectively). So, using the condition onp, we have 2B + 1 ≤p, and since |X| = (pp 2 ) n , we get the stated bound on ρ.
We remark that the bound on the leakage rate ρ of F NTRU in Lemma 9 is (since logp > log p + O(log n)) greater than 1− log p 3 log p+O(log n) > 2/3. As explained in Section 4.1, the original Peikert-Waters construction [PW08] of an IND-CCA2 encryption scheme requires ABOs with a leakage rate < 1/2, and thus can not be directly instantiated with F NTRU . Instead, we will use a generalization of the Peikert-Waters scheme that can work with ABOs having a leakage rate greater than 1/2.
The lossy branch hiding property follows directly from the IND-CPA security of the underlying pNErr encryption scheme (which in turn is as hard as the Ring-LWE problem, see Lemma 7). The Peikert-Waters construction [PW08] of IND-CCA2 encryption from ABO lossy trapdoor functions uses a pair of ABO lossy trapdoor functions F 1 and F 2 2 . The ciphertext contains F 1 (b, x) and F 2 (b, x) for a random x that is hashed to obtain a key with which to mask the message. The security proof relies on the assumption that for the lossy branch b = b * , the pair (F 1 (b * , x), F 2 (b * , x)) does not leak all the information on x. If both F 1 and F 2 have leakage rate ρ on their lossy branch b * , then the leakage rate of the pair (F 1 (b * , x), F 2 (b * , x)) is at most 2ρ, so to ensure that not all the information on x is leaked, we must have ρ < 1/2. Unfortunately, the leakage rate of our ABO F NTRU is greater than 2/3, so F NTRU cannot be directly used in this construction.
Instead, we show that the Peikert-Waters construction generalizes to use ciphertexts containing k ≥ 2 ABO evaluations
, where F 1 , . . . , F k denote k ABO functions, and the evaluation points (x 1 , . . . , x k ) sampled from a (k − 1)-of-k Subset Reconstructible Distribution (SRD k−1,k ), in which any subset of k − 1 of the x i 's suffices to uniquely reconstruct all x i 's (the Peikert-Waters construction corresponds to the case k = 2). The advantage of using the SRD k−1,k distribution for k > 2, as first observed by Mol and Yilek [MY10] , is that the min-entropy of the SRD k−1,k distribution when sampled with a Reed-Solomon code is (k − 1) log |X| versus the ≤ kρ log |X| leaked min-entropy, implying that the leakage rate of
Hence by using a sufficiently large k, one can make ρ (k) exceed ρ by an arbitrarily small amount. In particular, starting with ρ ≈ 2/3 as in our ABO, a constant k ≥ 4 suffices for our scheme, so the ciphertext length only incurs a constant factor overhead over the length of a single ABO output (which corresponds to a single NTRU ciphertext).
We remark that Mol and Yilek applied the k-product one-way function F (k) to the IND-CCA2 encryption scheme of Rosen and Segev [RS09] , that requires F (k) to be one-way under the SRD k−1,k distribution. The advantage of our generalized Peikert-Waters scheme over Rosen-Segev when the underlying functions F i are lossy, is that in our scheme the only lower bound constraint on k comes from the requirement that F (k) is lossy (which for our ABO F NTRU , can be satisfied with a constant k = O(1)), whereas in the Rosen-Segev scheme, k is also lower bounded by the security parameter (because in Rosen-Segev, k is lower bounded by the public key length of a one-time signature scheme, or at least the length of a collision-resistant hash of the public key). Thus, starting from ρ-lossy ABO functions F i , our generalized Peikert-Waters scheme yields shorter ciphertexts than Rosen-Segev by a factor Ω((1 − ρ) · n), where n denotes the security parameter.
Construction
Primitive 5 shows our generalized Peikert-Waters scheme GPW k , parameterized by an integer k. We use an ABO lossy trapdoor function family F = (KG F , F, F −1 ) with function input space X and branch space B, which is ρ-lossy. As in the Peikert-Waters scheme, we also use a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme OTS = (OTS.KG, OTS.Sign, OTS.Ver) with public key space P . We assume for convenience that P ∪ {b 0 } ⊆ B, for some branch b 0 ∈ P (if |P | > |B|, we can hash a key in P into P ′ ⊂ B using a collision-resistant hash function). We also use a family H of universal hash functions from X k to {0, 1} ℓ . We assume that we have efficient algorithms Samp k−1,k and Rec k−1,k for, respectively, sampling from the distribution SRD k−1,k over X k , and reconstructing x j from {x i } i =j for any (x 1 , . . . , x k ) output by Samp k−1,k and any j ∈ [k], and that the min-entropy of SRD k−1,k is µ ≥ (k − 1) log X (as mentioned above, the latter assumption can be satisfied using Shamir's secret sharing scheme [MY10] ).
Primitive 5 Generalized Peikert-Waters encryption scheme GPW k Key generation. Given input parameters 1 n and k, run algorithm KG F k times on input (1 n , b 0 ) to get k independent key pairs (pk i , sk i ) (i ∈ [k]) for ABO lossy trapdoor function family F , all having lossy branch b 0 . Sample a hash function h ←֓ H. Return key pair (pk, sk) with secret key sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk k−1 ) and public key pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk k , h).
Encryption. Given public key pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk k , h) and message M ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , run OTS.KG to generate a one-time signature key pair (sk S , pk S ). (y 1 , . . . , y k , C) ). Return ciphertext c = (pk S , y 1 , . . . , y k , C, σ) . S , y 1 , . . . , y k , C, σ) and secret key sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk k−1 ), check that OTS. Ver(pk S , (y 1 , . . . , y k , C) 
Decryption. Given ciphertext c = (pk
The security of the scheme is summarized by Theorem 3, a quantitative generalization of Theorem 4.2 in [PW08] (the latter is the special case k = 2 of Theorem 3). • An attack A h against the lossy branch hiding property of the ABO lossy trapdoor family F , with run-time
Proof.
The proof consists of 2k + 2 games, where each game consists of an IND-CCA2 experiment running with attacker A, but the games differ in either their key generation algorithm, decryption oracle algorithm, or challenge ciphertext generation algorithm. In each game Game i , there is a uniformly random bit b ∈ {0, 1} that indicates the message chosen by the IND-CCA2 challenger to encrypt in the challenge ciphertext, and there is a bit b ′ ∈ {0, 1} returned by A at the end of the game. We define the event that A wins the game (i.e. b ′ = b) by S i . The games are as follows.
Game 1 . This is the original IND-CCA2 attack against GPW k using the scheme's specified key generation, decryption and encryption algorithms, to generate the public key pk given to A, answer A's decryption oracle queries, and generate the challenge ciphertext c
given to A, respectively, with
* is generated as a ciphertext for the message M b for b ←֓ U ({0, 1}). Note that since pk * S is independent of the message M b , we may assume that it (and the associated signature secret key sk S ) are generated using OTS.KG during the key generation stage at the beginning of the game. This convention is followed for all subsequent games. Note that by definition, we have Prob[S 1 ] = 1/2 + ε.
Game 2 . We change the decryption oracle algorithm, so that on queried ciphertext c = (pk S , y 1 , . . . , y k , C, σ), it outputs ⊥ if pk S = pk * S , and otherwise it works as in the previous game. Note that the view of A is identical in this game as in the previous one, unless the following event E occurs: A queries a ciphertext c = c * with pk S = pk * S and σ is a valid signature on message (y 1 , . . . , y k , C) with respect to verification public key pk * S . Thus we obtain an attack A s against the strong existential unforgeability of signature scheme OTS with run-time T and success probability Prob[E], where
Game 3 . We change the key generation algorithm, so that the kth ABO key pair (sk k , pk k ) is generated by running KG F on input (1 n , pk * S ) (i.e. we make the kth ABO lossy at branch pk * S , rather than branch b 0 , which was the lossy branch in the previous game). Since the secret key sk k is never used in this game, it follows that if Prob[S 3 ] differs from Prob[S 2 ], we obtain a distinguisher attack A 3 against the lossy branch hiding property of F , with run-time T and distinguishing advantage ε 3 = |Prob[S 3 ] − Prob[S 2 ]|.
, and define the following pair of games:
• Game j(i) . We change the decryption oracle algorithm, so that it uses the k − 1 ABO secret keys {sk t } t =i to recover {x t } t =i from {y t } t =i , instead of using the k − 1 ABO secret keys {sk t } t =i+1 to recover the corresponding {x t } t =i+1 from {y t } t =i+1 , which was the case in the previous game. Let c denote a valid ciphertext queried to the decryption oracle in this game (resp. the previous game), i.e. a ciphertext with pk S = pk * S , y t = F(pk t , pk S , x t ) for all t ∈ [k] such that (x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a sample in the support of SRD k−1,k . By the fact that pk S ∈ {pk * S , b 0 } is not a lossy branch, and the δ-inversion correctness property of F , we know that, except for an event E inv over the choice of the {pk t , sk t } t∈ [k] , the decryption algorithm in Game j(i) (respectively Game j(i)−1 ) will correctly recover {x t } t =i (resp. {x t } t =i+1 ), so all x t 's will recovered correctly in both games by the (k − 1)-of-k recovery property of the SRD k−1,k distribution, thus giving the same decryption oracle answer. And if the queried ciphertext c is invalid, the decryption oracle will return ⊥ in both games, due to the checks x t ∈ X and y t = F(pk t , pk S , x t ) for all t ∈ [k]. It follows that Prob[S j(i) ] = Prob[S j(i)−1 ], unless the event E inv occurs during key generation.
• Game j(i)+1 . We change the key generation algorithm, so that the ith ABO key pair (sk i , pk i ) is generated by running KG F on input (1 n , pk * S ), i.e. we make the ith ABO lossy at branch pk * S , rather than branch b 0 , which was the lossy branch in the previous game. Since the secret key sk i is never used in this game (thanks to the change in the previous game), it follows that if Prob[S j(i)+1 ] differs from Prob[S j(i) ], we obtain a distinguisher attack A j(i)+1 against the lossy branch hiding property of F , with run-time T and distinguishing advantage ε
Game 2k+2 . We change the challenge ciphertext generation algorithm, computing
in the previous game. Since this makes C * and hence the view of A independent of b, the success probability of A in this game is Prob[S 2k+2 ] = 1/2. On the other hand, in the previous game, the key generation sets pk * S as the lossy branch for all k ABO instances in the public key. Since each of the k ABO instances is ρ-lossy, the y * 1 , . . . , y * k in the challenge ciphertext leak at most k · ρ log |X| of the min-entropy 
Finally, we observe that Prob[
where the last inequality follows from the δ-inversion correctness of F and the union bound, since E inv can occur in any of 2k key generation runs of F . Combining with |Prob[
−n , which implies that one of the k + 1 quantities
, and completes the proof.
A Simpler IND-CCA2 KEM
In practice, for encrypting long messages efficiently, one typically uses a hybrid encryption scheme. In such a scheme, the message is encrypted with a symmetric key encryption scheme based on fast primitives such as AES [DR02] , while the symmetric key is encrypted by a public-key encryption scheme. Since the public-key ciphertext only needs to encrypt a uniformly random symmetric key, rather than a given input message, the public-key primitive needed can be somewhat simpler than a full public-key encryption scheme, and is called a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) [CS03] . The encryption algorithm of a KEM takes as input the public key and a security parameter, and returns a uniformly random key K in the key space {0, 1} ℓ and ciphertext c for K. The IND-CCA2 security model for a KEM is similar to that for a public-key encryption scheme, except that the attacker does not provide challenge messages. Instead, it has to distinguish between the output (K * , c * ) of the KEM encryption algorithm, and (K, c * ), where K is a uniformly random key in {0, 1} ℓ , chosen independently of K * . It is shown in [CS03] that the hybrid public-key encryption scheme obtained by combining an IND-CCA2 KEM with an IND-CCA2 symmetric encryption scheme is IND-CCA2 secure (note that the IND-CCA2 symmetric encryption scheme can be efficiently built from fast symmetric key primitives).
We observe that, at a modest cost, the above construction can be simplified in the KEM setting, replacing the one-time signature scheme in the above scheme by a collision-resistant hash function family G mapping X k to B G ⊆ B (here X and B denote the input and branch space, respectively, of the ABO lossy trapdoor function family). The resulting scheme is shown as Primitive 6. The security of the scheme follows by appropriate modifications to the proof of Theorem 3, and can be stated as follows (see full version of the paper for details). Primitive 6 Generalized Peikert-Waters KEM GPWKEM k Key generation. Given input parameters 1 n and k, run algorithm KG F k times on input (1 n , b 0 ) to get k independent key pairs (pk i , sk i ) (i ∈ [k]) for ABO lossy trapdoor function family F , all having lossy branch b 0 . Sample a universal hash function h ←֓ H, and a collision-resistant hash function g ←֓ G. Return key pair (pk, sk) with secret key sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk k−1 , g, h) and public key pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk k , g, h). = (pk 1 , . . . , pk k , g, h), sample (x 1 , . . . , x k (x 1 , . . . , x k ) , and for i ∈ [k], compute y i = F(pk i , pk S , x i ) (i.e. use branch b for all k evaluations). Return key K = h(x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ {0, 1} ℓ and ciphertext c = (b, y 1 , . . . , y k ). = (b, y 1 , . . . , y k ) and secret key sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk k−1 , g, h) , (x 1 , . . . , x k ) . Else, return ⊥.
Encryption. Given public key pk
) = Samp k−1,k , compute branch b = g
Decryption. Given ciphertext c
• An attack A c against the collision-resistance of hash family G with run-time T c = T and success probability ε c ≥ ε ′ k+1 .
Instantiation and Choice of Parameters
Our NTRUCCA scheme is an instantiation of the GPW k from the previous section. In this section, we present this instantiation and how to choose the underlying parameters to achieve a quasi-optimal ciphertext and key length of O(n log n), where n is the security parameter (i.e. the time to break the CCA2 security of the scheme is 2 Ω(n) ), assuming that solving the Poly(n)-SVP problem in ideal lattices of dimension n takes 2 Ω(n) time in the worst-case. The main purpose of this is to demonstrate the feasibility of our result asymptotically. In practice, one can choose parameters similar to the way parameters are chosen for the NTRUEncrypt scheme, based on careful estimates for the performance of the latest lattice reduction algorithms.
The NTRUCCA scheme is defined as the GPW k scheme with the following instantiation choices, in terms of n, the security parameter. We let ε, ε p > 0 denote positive constants (independent of n) that one may adjust to tradeoff the scheme's concrete performance. The constant ε controls the uniformity of the NTRU key h (its statistical distance from uniform over R q is at most 2 3n q −ε·n , by Theorem 2). The constant ε p controls the size of the ABO branch space B (its size is |B| = p n/2 ).
The procedure we use for choosing parameters is as follows. We choose αq = θ(n 1.5 ) to satisfy worst-case reduction condition against 2 o(n) -time attacks, by Theorem 1. Next, setting p = n εp , we choosep = p·ω(n 1.5 log nαq), the condition in lossiness Lemma 9. Then, we plug the condition on σ from lossy branch hiding Lemma 10 in the 2 −Ω(n) -correctness condition on q from Lemma 8. This determines our choice of q and σ and η, and then we can determine from αq and q the value of α −1 and hence the resulting γ-IdSVP approximation factor.
• ABO Trapdoor Function Family F : We use the NTRU ABO F NTRU (n, q, p,p, σ, α, η) from Section 3.2 with the following parameters:
-q = Θ n max(5.5+εp ,5+2εp ) 1/2−2ε .
-p = n εp .
-p = Θ n 3+εp .
-σ = Θ n 1+max(5.5+εp,5+2εp)· 1/2+2ε 1/2−2ε .
-α −1 = Θ n max(5.5+εp ,5+2εp ) 1/2−2ε −1.5 .
-η −1 = Θ(nq).
Note that this choice of parameters implies:
-F NTRU ABO leakage rate, ρ ≤ 1 − (By Lemma 9).
-F NTRU ABO input space entropy, log |X| = n · (log p + 2 logp) = (3ε p + 6 + o(1)) · n log n. .
• One-Time Signature Scheme OTS: We use the One-Time Signature scheme of [LM08] . It operates on vectors of dimension m ots ≥ 2 over the ring R qots = Z qots [x]/(x n ots + 1), with a public key of length (m ots + 2) · n ots log q ots and a signature of length ≤ m ots · n ots log q ots . We instantiate it with:
-m ots = 2.
-q ots = Θ(n 5 ots log 5+ε ′ n ots ).
-Worst-case IdSVP Approximation Factor, γ ots = O(n 4 ots log 3 n ots ).
-n ots ≤ n log p 8 log qots = Θ(n). (Note this implies that the verification key length is ≤ B).
• Universal Hash Family H: We use a random linear mapping from GF (2 ℓ ) k ′ to GF (2 ℓ ), where:
(This means that the key length of H is O(n log n) and evaluating it costs O(k ′ ℓ) = O(n) time).
• Samp k−1,k and Rec k−1,k : We use three Reed-Solomon codes (one over GF (p n ) and two over GF (p n )) to implement Samp k−1,k for encoding x ∈ R p ands,ē ∈ Rp, and we use Lagrange interpolation to implement Rec k−1,k . Both can be done in time O(n).
Overall, we obtain the following asymptotic result on the security and efficiency of the scheme. . The scheme has key and ciphertext size of O(n log n) and encryption
and decryption computation time of O(n).
Note that with the current state of the art, the best quantum attack against Poly(n)-IdSVP takes time 2 Ω(n) , so with this assumption, the above results says that for any constant 0 < ε < 1/2, and ε p > 0, the time required to break the IND-CCA2 security of NTRUCCA is 2 Ω(n) .
Conclusion
We constructed the first asymptotically efficient IND-CCA2 secure variant of the NTRUEncrypt encryption scheme, with a provable security from worst-case problems in ideal lattices. Although the efficiency overhead of our scheme over the IND-CPA scheme of [SS11a] ) amounts to only a constant factor, this factor could in practice be quite significant. An interesting direction for future work is to construct provably secure variants of NTRUEncrypt which have a smaller constant overhead factor close to 1 (as well as reducing the constant overhead of [SS11a] over the original heuristic NTRUEncrypt scheme).
